Cities and crimes: Urbanisation and security conundrums in Ibadan, Nigeria

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Abstract

This article examines the interface between urbanisation and (in)security in Ibadan, Nigeria. It notes that urbanisation in Ibadan has had twin security impacts: engendered multiple security threats and diverse security responses from governments (federal and state) and residents, individually and collectively, evinced in the deployment of traditional (unorthodox) security mechanisms, walled and gated houses, walled and gated neighbourhoods, and use of electronic security devices in residences and neighbourhoods, among others. It argues that whereas all residents are confronted by the problem of insecurity, there are some differences in the character of the security threats, and responses to security threats that residents confront across the residential districts of the city. The paper concludes that unless the idea of planned cities and controlled or managed urbanisation is adopted and implemented, efforts, by governments (federal and state) and residents, individually and collectively, to successfully address the problem of urban insecurity are bound to be inadequate and ineffective.

Keywords: Urbanisation, Urban insecurity, Urban security response, Violence, Neighbourhood watch, Vigilante, Ibadan.

1. Introduction

One of the major issues of concern in the world is that of insecurity. The increasing rates in many developing countries of violent crimes and criminalities, including armed robbery, kidnapping, and armed banditry, as a result of the socio-economic and political dysfunctional conditions of such countries, and cases of terrorism, including the event of September 11, 2001 (the 9/11 terrorist attack) in the United States (US) have compelled many in the academic and non-academic circles, as well as multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and its agencies to interrogate the issue of insecurity in the world.

In doing this, however, urbanisation is often implicated as a major driver of insecurity. Though this underlies the explanations of security challenges in cities in countries such as South Africa, Brazil, Venezuela, India, and Ghana (Salahub et al, 2020), this article focuses on urban insecurity in Nigeria, concentrating specifically on Ibadan, a city lying within latitude 7° 19' 08" and 7° 29' 25" of the equator and longitude 3° 47' 50" and 4° 0' 22" (Fabiyi, 2004). A number of studies exist on urban insecurity in Ibadan, including Makinde (2020), Popoola et al (2018), Adigun (2013) and Fabiyi (2004), this paper's point of departure, however, is that it examines the nature of urban insecurity, and responses to it, showing patterns, peculiarities, similarities and differences in the character of insecurity, and response to it, in the city's residential districts. This is unlike Makinde (2020) who provides data on how

residents in gated communities perceived their safety within those communities, Adigun (2013) that quantitatively shows differential in crime incidence in the residential districts of the city, and Fabiyi (2004) that demonstrates how residents of gated communities police their neighbourhoods; essentially providing information on gated neighbourhoods, which are mostly found in many new and developing sites of the residential districts of the city.

The study that closely corresponds to the present study is *House and Neighbourhood responses to House Burglary in Ibadan* by Popoola et al (2018). Indeed, house burglary is a major crime in Ibadan metropolis, resulting in different responses by residents to prevent and combat it. Using mixed method (quantitative and qualitative) research approach, Popoola et al discusses the phenomenon of house burglary and responses to it across the city of Ibadan. Nevertheless, residents of Ibadan are confronted by many other violent crimes (security threats), and there are equally differences and similarities in the type of violent crimes and responses to violent crimes among the residential districts of the city. These suggest that apart from complementing the study by Popoola et al, and similar studies, this study seeks to extend knowledge on the variety of security threats and government-led and residents-led (individual and collective) responses to security threats in cities through purely qualitative approach.

This study theorizes that urbanisation is bound to promote and enhance the security of people living in urban areas. This is in view of the fact that urbanisation process, as the experiences of the developed countries have shown, has the tendency to increase economic productivity and social interactions of people; giving them more socio-economic opportunities, which foster integration and cooperation amongst them and ultimately reduces potential threats to their individual and collective security. The above assumption motivates four critical questions with respect to urbanisation-security nexus in Ibadan, Nigeria:

(1) What has been the nature of urbanisation process in Ibadan?

(2) How has urbanisation process influenced the emergence and the nature of residential districts in Ibadan?

(3) To what extent has urbanisation impacted security of the people in residential districts of Ibadan?

(4) How have residents, individually and collectively, responded to security threats/issues in residential districts of Ibadan?

2. Framing urbanisation, security, and insecurity

Urbanisation and security are two concepts that lack universally accepted definitions, as there are different perspectives of both concepts, as well as differences in the understanding of the nexus between them. With respect to the former, scholars, including Bloch et.al (2015), Oyeleye (2013), Potts (2012), and Keivani (2009) assume that urbanisation is about a significant population increase in a settlement. While Keivani (2009, 5) notes that there is a sentiment in some countries to limit urbanisation to rural development, thereby suggesting that urbanisation takes place when there is rural-urban migration, Bloch et.al (2015), plainly construes urbanisation as "an increase in the proportion of a country or region's population residing in urban settlements" (p.4). Like Bloch et.al (2015), Potts (2012) explains urbanisation as a process "whereby an increasing proportion of the population lives in urban settlements" (p.2).

It is further contended by Potts (2012) that urbanisation only occurs when the rate of urban population growth exceeds that of the national population growth. The emphasis on increase in population size as the major determinant of urbanisation is the reason why urban settlements (towns, cities and megacities) are denoted by their population sizes. Thus, while settlements with population not less than 20,000 people (given the fact that definitions of urban vary from country to country, though 20,000 is the commonly used threshold) are often designated as urban centres (in form of towns and cities), megacities are urban settlements with a population that is 10 million and above (NATO Strategic Direction South Hub 2019, 3).

Based on this idea, it is argued that many people in today's world live in urban centres, as there are more towns and cities as well as megacities (settlements with over twenty thousand people) in the world than ever before (UN-Habitat 2016). This underscores the

reference to the twenty-first century (21st century) as the urban century, and today's world as an urbanising world (Muggah 2016). However, a number of other scholars, including Gilbert (1999) have shown that urbanisation is not about increase in population but a shift from rural to modern way of life; arguing that urbanisation involves economic, social and cultural changes. Accordingly, it is opined that urbanisation is "part and parcel of the process of modernization – a phenomenon that involves a shift from agricultural to urban forms of work, a change in social relationships, and modifications in family life" (Gilbert 1999, 5). The salience of the latter definition is that population increase should ordinarily lead to increase in social and economic interactions among people, with the effect that there would be transformation in the people's lifestyles.

Like urbanisation, security is also a contested concept (Buzan 1991, cited in Baldwin 1997, p.10). The contest is compounded by the fact that there has been a shift from the traditional idea of security, which is that of state/national security, to a contemporary idea, that of human security. While state/national security refers to the protection of the state from any threats (internal and external) to its existence (Baldwin 1997); human security is explained as the protection of the individual members of the state from hunger, crime, diseases, social conflicts, unemployment, political repression and environmental hazards (Booysen 2002; UNDP 1994). Therefore, whereas security is explained by Savitch (1999, 14) as "conditions of stability, order, and predictability", the European Union (EU) construes it as all initiatives that protect and promote human as well as state survival (EU 2009, 62). The importance of the EU conceptualisation is that it encompasses state/national security concerns as well as human security concerns.

Furthermore, despite the contested nature of security, its contrast, insecurity, is not; generally regarded as a state of being insecure or unsafe physically (bodily), psychologically (emotionally), economically and/or socially as a result of violence and/or crime. Two concepts central to the notion of insecurity are violence and crime. Though often used interchangeably, because they lead to insecurity, and with contested meanings and multiple related typologies and characterization, violence and crime are theoretically dissimilar. On the one hand, violence is construed as the use of physical force (physical violence), threatened or actual, against oneself,

another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development, or deprivation (World Health Organization [WHO] 2002, 4). On the other hand, crime is about breaking of rules (Felson 2009), leading to injury (to a person, group or state or society) or death. However, despite the manifold and related manifestations of violence and crime (otherwise the manifestations of insecurity), including burglary, rape, arson, battery and murder, it is not all types of violence that are crimes (e.g. structural violence i.e. unequal power relations or unequal opportunities in a society or state), and not all crimes are violent (e.g. certificate forgery and illicit drug use) (Felson 2009). Consequently, this study is framed around the violent manifestations of insecurity (excluding structural violence and non-violent crimes) in urban settings. In particular, special focus is on physical violence, which include actual or threats of burglary, carjacking, murder, and armed robbery.

3. Urbanisation and (in)security: the literature and theoretical frame

Ample literature exists on the intersection of urbanisation and (in)security, including in the countries of the Global South. Many of the literature, including Salahub et al (2020) have demonstrated and argued that there is a strong relationship between rapid urbanisation, rising inequality and poverty, particularly spatial inequality, and growing violence and insecurity in cities of the South. Salahub et al (2020), Ikelechukwu (2018), Muggah (2016), UN-Habitat (2016), Oyeleye (2013), Akiyode (2012), Cummins (2011), Savitch (1999), Brennan (1999), and Gilbert (1999) are some of the studies that have shown that security, and/or the need for it, is a natural consequence of urbanisation. Whereas it is commonly believed that urban centres are engines of economic and social growth and development, as Keivani (2009), for example, argues that "cities create wealth, enable economic functions, and offer greater life opportunities for their inhabitants…" (p.7), it is equally argued that urbanisation process does not necessarily guarantee the security of urban dwellers. Gilbert (1999, 4), for example, argues that "there is no consistent or meaningful relationship that exists between urbanisation and security." Gilbert (1999) and Muggah (2016) argue that security in urban centres depends essentially on specific policies of governments rather than urbanisation itself. Secure urban development, Gilbert (1999) opines, is the

"outcome of policies – tools of government action - and urbanisation is only a secondary explanation" (p.4).

This is underscored by the different approaches/models that have been developed to promote resilience in cities and address fragility or preponderance to fragility, including insecurity. These include the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) model, which involves preventing violence through a set of interventions, such as physical upgrading and other programmes to support human development in a determined geographical area denominated Safe Node Area (Brown-Luthango et al 2016, 17). In the same vein is the Enhanced People's Housing Process (EPHP) approach, where beneficiaries actively contribute to the decision-making and construction of their houses (Ibid). There is equally the Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) model, which focuses on preventing crimes through proper design and effective use of the built environment (Cozens et al, 2005). The CPTED approach involves a number of strategies such as formal surveillance (e.g. police patrols) and mechanical surveillance (e.g. street lighting and closed circuit cameras (CCTV)). Suffice to note that these and similar approaches are not fool proof, as they have in practical terms a number of shortcomings. Yet, they have nonetheless been used with some degree of success or effectiveness across the world, including in neighbourhoods in Cape Town, South Africa (Brown-Luthango et al, 2016), Ciudad Juarez (Mexico), Bogota and Medellin (Colombia) (NPR 2016 cited in Meggah, 2016). Cozens et al (2005) also reveals that studies in the United States and United Kingdom have shown that the CPTED strategies have proven to be effective in reducing crime and fear of crime.

The case study presented below will attempt to shed light on the issue of insecurity (physical violence) and the strategies deployed to tackle it. It presents different contexts and different approaches to crime prevention, which implies that efforts must be made to compare. These provide important insights into the intersection between urbanisation, insecurity (or threat of insecurity) and different types and/or approaches of security provisioning in residential areas of the city.

4. Research Methods

The study adopts a qualitative case study research method, using primary and secondary data on Ibadan (in Oyo State), southwest Nigeria. Participant's observations, triangulated with informal conversations (unstructured interviews) and interactions with residents (landlords and tenants) of selected communities constitute the primary sources of data. Official government records, library materials, periodicals and online resources provide the secondary data. The research covered six, out of the eleven, Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Ibadan. The six LGAs are Akinyele LGA, Ibadan North LGA, Ibadan North-East LGA, Ibadan North-West LGA, Ibadan South-East LGA, and Ibadan South-West. Data were collected between 2015 and 2019. The paper demonstrates use of comparative analyses of the study areas.

The choice of Ibadan was informed by the fact that it is the most urbanised city in Oyo State. Ibadan is, for example, the economic, financial and political headquarters of Oyo State, with notable settlements. The settlements in Ibadan are however multifaceted, consisting in most cases an assemblage of different residential types. Therefore, the study, for analytical purposes, used Ayeni (1994) residential land-use classification, which classified the residential areas in Ibadan into three. These are (i) the core area/district, inhabited largely by the indigenous population and early non-indigenous Yoruba migrants and with high population and housing densities, (ii) the new residential districts, comprising low to medium quality residential areas, inhabited largely by immigrants of Yoruba and non-Yoruba ancestry, and (iii) high-class 'reservation areas'/high-class residential districts, which have low population and housing densities (Ayeni, 1994, p. 82). These correspond to Ayeni (1982) classification of residences in the city into high density, medium density and low density respectively, which Abumere (1994) argues correspond roughly to Mabogunje (1962) residential classification of the city into (i) core and older suburb; (ii) newer eastern, newer western and post 1952 suburbs; and (iii) Bodija Estate/Reservations, respectively (Abumere, 1994, p. 91).

Based on the scheme, Table 1 below provides the distribution and location of the residential districts/areas used for the study. Convenience sample was used, and neighbourhoods were chosen on the basis of accessibility, and participants selected

on the basis of their availability and willingness to provide needed information for the research.

Table 1: Breakdown of study areas

Selected LGAs	Selected neighbourhoods	Classification of neighbourhoods
Ibadan North-West	Ayeye, Oritamerin, Amunigun	Core residential area
	Eleyele	New residential area
	Jericho GRA	High-class residential area
Ibadan South-East	Idi-Arere, Odinjo, Eleta, and Mapo	Core residential area
Ibadan South-West	Beere, Foko, Labaowo Ogunpa, and Gege	Core residential area
	Ososami, part of Oke Ado and Oke Bola	New residential area
	Iyaganku GRA, Oluyole estate,	High-class residential area
Akinyele*	Orogun, Sasa, Ijefun, Ajobo, Arulogun	New residential areas
Ibadan North	Agbowo	New residential area
	Old Bodija estate & New Bodija estate	High-class residential area
Ibadan North-East	Ode-Oolo, Opoyeosa, Isale Afa, Beyerunka, Ogboriefon's compound and Ita Bale Olugbode	Core residential area
	Sango	New residential area
	Ikolaba GRA, Agodi GRA, Samonda-Aerodrome Estate.	High-class residential area

*This LGA does not have any Core or High-class residential areas within its territorial space

Conversations, including unstructured interviews and interactions with residents of the selected areas provided the opportunity to gather information on the nature and type of security challenges that they face as a result of the neighbourhood they reside in (see Table 2 below). This method of data gathering was chosen because of the fact that the issue of response to security challenges is a sensitive topic. During the interactions, close attention was given to verbal and non-verbal information, including observations of how residential types shaped security consciousness and response of residents. Information gathered through both primary and secondary data sources were analysed separately and then compared as a way of validating and corroborating findings. The information gathered was qualitatively analysed, using content analysis (see Table 2 below).

5. Results and Discussion

5.1. Security issues in residential districts of Ibadan

Despite the differences in the nature of the residential districts (as shown in Table 2), security of lives and properties has remained an issue of paramount concern in all the residential districts of Ibadan. Residents of the three residential districts of the city are vulnerable, though in varying degrees, to different violent crimes.

5.1.1. Security issues in Core residential district

Street violence by hoodlums, gang members and cultists is particularly peculiar to and common in the core area of the city than in any other residential district. The violence is often about contested territorialities; often a struggle by rival groups to establish authority or control over a neighbourhood or street or spot in a neighbourhood, and at times over familial matters. Between 2017 and 2020, for instance, neighbourhoods in the core area, including Idi-Arere, Iyana-Asuni, Born Photo, Isale-Asaka, Oritamerin, Popo Yemoja, Opoyeosa, Abebi, Idikan, Inalende, and Isale-Osi, were notorious for gang

violence, characterized by death and destruction of properties, over diverse issues, including control over right to collect land rent (Akinselure, 2020, 2019; Adebayo, 2017). The notoriety of the area for street violence made the State House of Assembly to demand for heavy police presence in those neighbourhoods (Akinselure, 2019). Violence between armed gangs (between the *Ebila* gang and *Ekugbemi* gang), in Olunde and Idi-Arere, over issue of collection of rent on an ongoing building project, resulted in the death of the leader of the Ekugbemi gang on April 11, 2020 (Oshodi & Akinselure, 2020). Subsequent reprisal attacks led to the death of the leader of the Ebila gang at Olomi, Kudeti on 12 July 2020 (Akanbi, 2020; Oyewale, 2020).

Table 2: Summary of Research Methods/Methods of Data Gathering

Residential areas/districts	Core areas	New residential areas/districts	High-class residential areas
Number and names of neighbourhoods	18	11	8
	Ayeye, Oritamerin, Amunigun, Idi-Arere, Odinjo, Eleta, Mapo, Beere, Foko, Labaowo Ogunpa, Gege, Ode-Oolo, Opoyeosa, Isale Afa, Beyerunka, Ogboriefon's compound and Ita Bale Olugbode	Eleyele, Ososami, part of Oke-Ado, part of Oke-Bola, Orogun, Sasa, Ijefun, Ajobo, Arulogun, Agbowo, Sango	Jericho GRA, Iyaganku GRA, Oluyole estate, Old Bodija estate, New Bodija estate, Ikolaba GRA, Agodi GRA, Samonda-Aerodrome GRA
Description	Inhabited largely by the indigenous population and early non-indigenous Yoruba migrants. Denoted by high population and housing densities. Typified by residents that are largely in the low-class and a few in the middle-class categories	Suburban/peripheral areas of the city with low to medium population and housing densities. Residents straddle the low, middle and upper classes of the society	Low population and housing densities. Denoted by residents that are mostly of the upper class, though with some middle-income earners.
Research tools	Personal observations (watching, listening and taking of notes) during field visits	Participant's observation as member of neighbourhood associations	Participant's observation as member of neighbourhood associations
	Unstructured interviews, which occurred through informal conversations and interactions, with residents during field visits.	Personal observations (watching, listening and taking of notes) during filed visits	Personal observations (watching, listening and taking of notes) during filed visits
	Documents, reports and news articles	Unstructured interviews with the leadership and members of 2 (Ijefun and Ajobo/Arulogun) neighbourhood associations. Conversations and interactions with residents of neighbourhoods during field visits.	Unstructured interviews with residents of neighbourhoods
			Documents, reports and news articles
		Documents, reports and news articles	
Data analysis	Text and narrative data content analysed: data organised by topics and questions - data categorised or coded by themes - information in each category summarised	Same	Same

Gang violence in the core area of the city is due to the nature of the district: high population density, overcrowded houses, high-level of poverty and illiteracy among residents and poor policing facilities. Other violent crimes common in the core area, perpetrated by criminally minded residents, are carjacking, theft or stealing, robbery, burglary, battery and assault, and house and store breaking. Except for some instances, this set of violent crimes are usually nonlethal when committed in the core area. This is because of the low social status of victims (usually poor and underprivileged), low economic value of victimised materials and the fact that the risks involved in the perpetration of the crimes are low and perpetrators are usually unarmed or lightly armed with knives, cutlass and/or locally produced guns. Hence, apart from street violence, other violent crimes commonly experienced in the core area are in the category of low-level violent crimes.

5.1.2. Security issues in New residential districts

Like the core residential district/area, violent crimes are perpetrated and experienced in the new residential districts of the city. However, unlike the core area, street violence is not common in new residential districts, except in neighbourhoods, such Alaro, Sango-Poly area, and Agbowo, where tertiary institutions students that are members of rival cult groups reside, and in neighbourhoods, such as Ojoo, Sasa and Iwo road area, that are adjacent to major motor parks where members of rival factions of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) are embroiled in violent clashes. Whenever it occurs, street violence in those neighbourhoods has essentially been about control of motor parks or asserting dominance over a rival group or reprisal attacks for a perceived injustice perpetrated by a rival group. The commonly experienced violent crimes in the new residential districts (i.e. those mentioned as being frequently experienced by residents) are armed robbery, carjacking (by armed or unarmed carjackers), burglary, home invasion, assault and battery; murder (or ritual killing), kidnapping, rape and other forms of sexual violence.[1]

These violent crimes are mostly perpetrated by the underprivileged but criminally minded residents, and some from the core area. An explanation for the broad array of crimes commonly experienced in the new residential districts is the nature and composition of the districts: suburban, with many educated, fairly educated and uneducated residents, some of whom are low-income, middle-income and high-income earners. Being an amalgam of all social classes, inequality among residents is unmistakable. While many middle and the few high-income earners, mostly educated, in the districts live in residences with indoor facilities, perimeter fence and borehole or deep well with pumping machine and solar or fuel-powered generator for supply of water and electricity respectively, the low-income earners in the districts, some of whom are educated and some uneducated, live in residences without most of these features/facilities. Hence, there is proclivity for low and high-level violent crimes in the districts.

5.1.3. Security threats in High-Class residential districts

Unlike the core area and new residential districts, street violence by hoodlums/miscreants and cult groups is a rarity in the high-class residential districts. This is due to the elitist, highbrow and exclusive character of the districts. The commonly reported, but infrequently experienced, violent crimes in the districts are armed robbery and burglary, particularly by armed burglars. However, burglary and armed robbery in the districts usually involved armed perpetrators, who invade residences and/or trail residents/visitors and kill or inflict serious bodily injuries on their victims, if resisted. Kidnaping, mostly for ransom, and carjacking by armed carjackers are also experienced by residents, but usually outside their residential districts, such as when traveling on the highway or driving within the city, and in some cases while driving or entering into their neighbourhoods.

The crimes perpetrated in the high-class residential districts, or crimes to which the residents of the districts are susceptible to, are in the category of the high-level violent crimes. This is however due to the high level of income and social status of some residents of the districts; the districts are homes to the high and mighty, and the rich and powerful in the city. These include politicians, wealthy businessmen and women, highly placed academics, judges and other professionals. The residences in the districts are mostly elegant, with flower beds and garden, perimeter fence, and facilities for constant supply of water and electricity. In addition, residents are noted

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[1] Of these, burglary, murder and rape, armed robbery and carjacking were observed by the author as the most frequently experienced by residents of new residential districts.

for possessing valuable material belongings/items, including state-of-the-art cars, expensive mobile phones, laptops, and jewelleries. These attributes/features, which are largely nonexistence in the core area and new residential districts, point to the issue of inequality and underscore the vulnerability of residents of the high-class residential districts to high-level violent crimes. Also, unlike the other two residential districts, the violent crimes experienced in the high-class residential districts are mostly perpetrated by outsiders or non-residents; the crimes are perpetrated mostly by criminals from the core area and/or new residential districts, assisted at times by some insiders/'residents'[2] who provide information to the criminals about their victims and the districts.

5.2. Responses to insecurity in residential districts of Ibadan

Insecurity in Ibadan, and by extension Oyo State, has necessitated different responses from governments (federal and state), individuals, and groups. It is important to note, however, that while security responses by the federal government are not exclusive to Ibadan, but are responses to the general state of insecurity in the country, responses by the government of Oyo State are complementary to those of the federal government. This is because issues relating to security (internal and external) of the country, including maintenance of law and order, are vested in the federal government by the Second Schedule, Section 4, of the 1999 (amended) Constitution (Federal Government of Nigeria [FGN], 2011); other levels of government (state and local government) are only to complement the federal government.

5.2.1. Federal and State responses

In response to the numerous security challenges that are prevalent across the country, the Federal Government of Nigeria has introduced a number of policing strategies. First and foremost, the federal government has put in place a formal policing architecture for the country, comprising police commands with different hierarchies of trained police personnel in each of the States in the country. To address specific crimes such as armed robbery, kidnapping and internet frauds, special police units

have been established, including the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), with operations in all the States. Similarly, police personnel are deplored on major roads across the country to stop and search passers-by in order to nip in the bud any possible threats to security of lives and properties of people. It is important to note that policing in Nigeria is typified by highhandedness, excessive use of force and police brutality, thus making it unpopular. This is underscored by the wave of protests in October 2020, called the #EndSARS protests, by youth across the country, including Ibadan, demanding for the disbandment of the special police units (i.e., the SARS units) that was notorious for serious human rights abuses, and an improvement in the general policing system in the country.

To complement the efforts of the federal government and enhance policing by the Nigeria Police Force, State governments, private organizations and well-meaning individuals often provide operational materials such as vehicles and motorbikes to police formations/commands in their States. Also, as part of federal and state efforts to improve security, community policing has been introduced in some States (DCAF, 2018). For instance, Oyo State has introduced special toll-free emergency telephone number (615) and installed Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras on some major roads in Ibadan to combat criminal activities (Daily Times, 2018). At the same time, collaborations between the police and other federal government-owned security agencies, including the military and paramilitary bodies, have been encouraged. This has given rise to joint security outfits in States, usually, a section of the State police command is charged with the task of speedy response to security emergencies. The joint security /units in the State police commands come under different names, including Operation Bust in Oyo State and Rapid Response Squad (formerly Operation Sweep) in Lagos State. In addition, some States have introduced other ad hoc policing arrangements, such as Amotekun, a security network created in January 2020 by the six southwestern States to complement efforts of the federal government-owned security apparatuses to combat insecurity arising from banditry, kidnappings, and killings, among others (Awosoji, 2020).

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[2] The use of 'residents' here denotes housemaids, security guards, and drivers, among others, living in the districts with and in the premises of their employers/bosses. They are not tenants or landowners; they are not permanent residents of the districts, but workers for permanent residents of the districts.

However, the various security strategies of governments (federal and state) have proven inadequate, as criminal activities in Ibadan, and across the country's major cities, have persisted (see Agboluaje 2020; Olaitan 2020 for example of incidences in Ibadan in 2020). This has been due to poor funding of the Police by the federal government, with the associated negative effect on training, procurement of equipment and overall management of the country's police force (DCAF, 2018). The inability of government-owned security agencies to adequately tackle insecurity has led to increasing resort by the people to non-state, individual and group actions toward provision of security in Ibadan.

5.2.2. Non-state/Grassroots responses

Personal observations revealed that provision of security in the residential districts of the city has been largely privatised. Evidence abound of residents' use, individually and collectively, of different measures to enhance security of lives and properties in their private homes and communities. Such 'self-help' initiatives include employing different non-state security service providers. Noticeable private security measures developed and used by residents, individually and/or collectively, to enhance security include construction of perimeter fence and metal gates for individual houses and neighbourhoods, street gates; hobnailed perimeter fences; perimeter fences fitted with broken bottles, barbed wire or electric barbed wires; iron doors and burglar-proof windows and doors in residences, and neighbourhood watch/vigilante. Also, there is the use of dogs (trained and untrained), electronic devices such as CCTV cameras, metal and explosives detectors in houses, and private guards from government-licensed private security companies (PSCs), and unregistered private guards/gatemen (commonly called *olode*).

Likewise, unorthodox security measures, namely, religious rituals such as prayers/incantations and traditional African charms (called *ogun* in Yoruba language) are used. The use and deployment of these measures, however, varies from one residential district to another due to the differences in the level of the security threats that residents are vulnerable to

and confronted with. The use of the measures also varies from residents to residents, including for those in the same residential districts, because of differences in social status, income level and religious beliefs.[3] Nevertheless, some commonalities are discernible in each residential districts category, and some differences between residential districts.

Non-state security measures in Core residential district

Given the largely low-level violent crimes that residents of core area are vulnerable to and confronted with, the common private security measures used are religious rituals, particularly traditional African charms (*Ogun* in Yoruba language), and neighbourhood vigilante.[4] In addition, unlicensed private night guards (*Olode* in Yoruba language), armed with locally-made weapons, including guns and amulet are deployed by wealthy traders and artisans (or wealthy residents) in the district.[5] Whereas neighbourhood vigilante is a collective security measure, as residents in a contiguous neighbourhood collaborate to fight violent crimes in their area, the use of traditional African charms and unlicensed night guards are individual security initiatives of individual residents for their residences.

Consequently, while some residents in the district employed unlicensed private security guards and/or used traditional charms for security against criminals, some lacked both measures, relying instead on neighbourhood vigilantes. However, unlike the use of unlicensed security guards and neighbourhood vigilantes, which are simple measures, traditional charms as a security measure in residences take different forms, including having either a broomstick or a bunch of broomsticks or a gourd tied with a red or black cloth and hung directly on top of the main entrance or entrances of the residence after some incantations have been made.[6] Residents who deployed the measure believed that it has the ability to arrest intruders, including thieves and burglars, and dispel/ward off evil spirit. As commonly remarked:

> *"Anyone who comes to steal or burgle the house will, as soon as he enters, pick up the*

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[3] It was observed, for example, that though the use of traditional charms (*ogun* in Yoruba language) is a security measure in a number of residences in the core area, not every resident used the measure because of their non-traditional religious beliefs.

[4] Personal observation by the author.

[5] Local untrained dogs are seen in some residences in the district; they are however used more as pets than as instruments of security.

[6] In some cases, items such as feathers and something that looks like local soap were seen attached to the broomsticks or put inside the hanging gourds.

broom/broomstick and start to sweep until the occupant(s) of the house return(s) or wake(s) up, if it was in the night."[7]

Though the efficacy and effectiveness of the measure cannot be scientifically verified, users believed and argued that it works; its efficacy and effectiveness is often predicated on the fact that it is an age long security measure among the Yoruba people.

Non-state security measures in New residential districts

For the new residential districts in the city, the common private security measures used by residents are perimeter fences with or without spikes, barbed wires or broken bottles; metal doors; metal gates and burglar-proof windows in residences; trained and untrained dogs, and creation of neighbourhood watch/vigilante, in addition to the use of perimeter fence with metal gates for contiguous neighbourhoods, street gates, crossbars, and deployment of unregistered private night guards (or *Olode*) in residences.[8] The broad array of private security measures used in the new residential districts is because the districts are amalgams of the different social classes in the society and residents are vulnerable to and confronted with all forms of violent crimes, from low to high-level violent crimes.

Consequently, while residences of low-income earners in the districts are unfenced, and without metal doors and burglar-proof windows, residences of middle- and high-income earners are mostly fitted with metal doors, burglar-proof windows, and perimeter fence with or without barbed wires or broken bottles, and metal gates for protection against criminals. In addition, local dogs are commonly seen in residences of low-income earners, because they are not costly to acquire and nurture. Besides, the security threats level to such residences is low. Well-bred and trained dogs are used to complement other security measures in most residences of middle- and high-income earners in the districts due to their susceptibility to high-level violent crimes.

Also, crossbars, of different heights, and/or two-leaf see-through street gates are erected at entrances of some neighbourhoods, including Gospel Town community, Goodness and Alaadun estates[9] in Akinyele LGA, to control/manage vehicular movement in and out of the neighbourhoods at night, while some neighbourhoods such as Ilupeju community in Akinyele LGA and most communities in Oke-Bola, Oke Ado, Liberty Stadium and Ososami in Ibadan South-West LGA lacked both features.[10] The choice of either street gate or crossbar in communities was however a function of residents' willingness or level of agreement/cooperation to address their common security problem.

The use of neighbourhood vigilante (or neighbourhood watch) is employed by all categories of residents (landlords and tenants) directly or indirectly, to provide security for the neighbourhood. The neighbourhood vigilantes normally cover residences in contiguous neighbourhoods; hence there are as many neighbourhood vigilantes as there are contiguous neighbourhoods in the new residential districts of Ibadan. The neighbourhood vigilantes in the new residential districts of the city are, however, of two types.

For residents who have perimeter fence around their neighbourhood(s), and metal gate(s) for entrance into the neighbourhood, the task of neighbourhood security at night is often contracted to security guards from licensed private security companies or unlicensed private night guards (*Olode*), while residents only pay monthly neighbourhood security levies. This type of neighbourhood vigilante (the Type A neighbourhood vigilante) is common in neighbourhoods dominated by middle- and high-income earners in the new residential districts, such as Providence Estate, Eleyele, Ibadan North-West LGA. Another type of neighbourhood vigilante (the Type B neighbourhood vigilante) is, however, noticeable in neighbourhoods with only metal crossbars, as a form of neighbourhood gates, and without perimeter fence, but where some residences have perimeter fence, and some do not. Examples are found in Ijefun, Isokun, Aba Eko, Sasa, and Sagbe communities in Akinyele LGA. In such places, though

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[7] This is the view held and generally expressed by those who believed in and/or used traditional charms for security.

[8] Personal observation by the author between 2016 and 2019.

[9] The author observed an indiscriminate use of the word estate in Ibadan. Although some communities in the new

residential districts are called estates (e.g. Alaadun estate), they are devoid of the necessary features, including good roads and serene environment, of government-established estates/GRAs and those created by private corporate organizations.

[10] Personal observation by the author, 12 July 2020.

neighbourhood security at night is contracted to unlicensed private night guards (*Olode*) and residents pay monthly security levies for the payment of the guards, whenever the need arises, such as if the communities are aware of an impending attack by criminals, residents complement the unlicensed private night guards (*Olode*) by serving as night security guards for a specified period of time.[11] This type of neighbourhood vigilante is common in neighbourhoods populated or dominated by low and middle-income earners. Participation in the neighbourhood vigilantes, of both types, is however, compulsory for residents (landlords and tenants), irrespective of their social class/status; refusal to participate often attracts condemnations and sanctions from the neighbourhood. For example, Vitas Bakery neighbourhood at Ring Road, Ibadan South-West LGA had a permanent poster affixed to the community gate with a bold inscription:

> *"Pay your community dues to avoid community shame. Thou shall not steal. Non-payment of community dues makes you a thief. Do not be an outcast."[12]*

At Ijefun, Sasa, Sagbe, and Ajobo communities, residents who default in payment of community security dues either have their electricity disconnected or are threatened with disconnection until they comply.[13] These actions, it was observed, was because of the broad security challenges that the neighbourhoods in the new residential districts are vulnerable to and are confronted with as a result of the fact that they are amalgams of all social classes.

Non-state security measures in High-Class residential districts

The private security measures common in the high-class residential districts of Ibadan, particularly Agodi GRA, Iyaganku GRA, Jericho GRA, Old and New Bodija estates, Oluyole estate and Samonda-Aerodrome are different from those in the core area and new residential districts. These include the use of perimeter fence, with spikes or barbed wires or electric wires, around residences and/or contiguous residences, alongside metal gates in houses and neighbourhoods, manned at night and daytime by either security guards from PSCs or unlicensed private guards; erection of street gates; trained and well-bred dogs, and deployment of electronic devices, particularly CCTV cameras and metal and explosives detectors, at some residences and in neighbourhoods.[14] While metal doors and burglar-proof windows are also deployed in some residences in the districts, such as in parts of Old and New Bodija estates, Oluyole estate and Jericho GRAs, bullet-proof doors and fortified glass windows (high-impact glass windows) are common in some others, including at Iyaganku GRA and Samonda-Aerodrome.[15]

Unlike neighbourhoods in new residential districts, where either crossbars or street gates are commonly used, both street gates and crossbars are mounted together and used in Old Bodija estate (Awogboro, Kongi, Ademiluyi, Methodist, Adeyi, Awosika etc), part of Jericho GRA, such as Jericho Hill GRA, and New Bodija and Oluyole estates.[16] However, while only street gates are common in Agodi GRA, neither street gates nor crossbars are used in Iyaganku GRA, except for few places such as Kobiowu crescent and Oba Adesida street.[17] In all the places where street gates are used, they are manned mostly by security guards contracted from licensed PSCs.[18] Furthermore, Type A neighbourhood vigilante is used in neighbourhoods that have street gates in the districts. The private security measures deployed in the high-class residential districts are due to the high socio-economic status of residents, which makes them to be more prone to high-level violent crimes than residents of other residential districts.

6. Conclusion

The findings of this study support the arguments made in the literature about the critical role that urbanisation plays in the issue of insecurity in cities. It catalyses security challenges, especially violent crimes, and engenders myriad of responses, including from non-state actors. This, in the case of Ibadan, is

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[11] Personal observation by the author from 2017 to 2019.
[12] Personal observation by the author, 12 July 2020.
[13] Personal observation by the author from 2016 to 2019.
[14] For security reasons, examples of neighborhoods with these features/attributes are omitted.
[15] Personal observation by the author, 12 July 2020.
[16] Personal observation by the author, 12 July 2020.

[17] Personal observation by the author, 12 July 2020.
[18] Personal observation by the author, 12 July 2020.

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not unrelated to the fact that the city is largely unplanned and poorly managed, a feature of fragile cities that Muggah (2016) argues arises not only from the inability or unwillingness of municipal authorities and their institutions, but also, in this case, as a result of failure of governments (federal, state and local) and their institutions, to deliver basic services to urban residents. Insecurity in all the residential districts of Ibadan has also been due to the issue of inequality and poverty. Rather a densely populated, with a little over 1.5million people (excluding five LGAs) by 2006 national census (NPC, 2010), urban poverty has been one of Ibadan's major problems (Adelekan, 2016, 6), due to limited access by residents to job and other opportunities as well as poor and inadequate wages for most workers. It is however important to note that poverty and inequality in Ibadan mirrors the twin problem of poverty and inequality in Nigeria as a whole, where an appreciable proportion (40.1% i.e., 82.9million Nigerians, excluding those in Borno State) of the population are poor, and urban poverty was 18.4%, and unemployment and underemployment rate at 55.4% as at 2019 (NBS, 2020). As a result, despite the various private (non-state) security measures introduced to complement government security measures, violent crimes have remained a recurrent problem, though in varying degrees, in the three residential districts of the city. For example, a female resident of Ijefun and another female resident of Sasa, two new residential neighbourhoods in Akinyele LGA, were raped and murdered in their residences on 5 and 13 June 2020 respectively (Premium Times, 2020; Sahara Reporter, 2020; Oyewale, 2020). Also, violence by armed gangs in Kudeti, a neighbourhood in the city's core residential district, resulted in the death of a person (a non-gang person) on 13 June 2020 (Ajayi, 2020).

However, crime rate in high-class residential districts has been much lower than in other two residential districts. This contradicts findings by Fabiyi (2004) that crime rate is highest in the low density (high-class) neighbourhoods but supports earlier quantitative studies by Adigun (2013), on Ibadan, and Agbola (1997), on Lagos. A careful analysis of media reports of violent crimes between April and June 2020, for instance, showed that violent crimes, such as rape, murder, street violence, burglary, and armed robbery, were perpetrated and experienced in the core area and new residential districts, as against none reported for the high-class residential districts. During the period, street violence by armed gangs (miscreants/hoodlums) was experienced in neighbourhoods in the core area (see Ajayi, 2020; Oshodi & Akinselure, 2020; Akinselure, 2020), and cases of rape, burglary and murder were experienced and reported by residents of new residential districts (see Premium Times, 2020; Sahara Reporter, 2020; Oyewale, 2020).

Consequently, with insights from cities that have turned the tide with regard to issues of insecurity, cities such as Ciudad Juarez, Bogota and Medellin (NPR 2016 cited in Meggah, 2016), it is imperative that a combination of strategies, including those ensconced in VPUU, CPTED and EPHP approaches, be adopted. To this end, it is important that existing town planning policy of government in Nigeria, which has allowed indiscriminate construction of houses in the new residential districts and failed to redevelop the core residential area, should be reviewed. Such review must articulate and introduce a policy of government that mandates existing and emerging residential neighbourhoods to be properly planned. This must include deliberate efforts at achieving urban renewal/upgrade of the core residential area and existing new residential districts through renovation and replacement of dilapidated residences with new buildings, electrification of neighbourhoods and creation of access and networks of good roads for easy accessibility by police and security agents during emergencies. Besides, efforts by the State government to provide CCTV cameras on major roads must be extended to the residential districts for effective crime prevention and management in the city. Streets and neighbourhoods in all the residential districts must be covered by and monitored with the CCTV cameras. However, the success and sustainability of this suggested intervention (renewal or upgrading of the core and new residential areas) depends largely on the ability and willingness of the governments (federal, state and local) to deliver basic services to the people, which Brown-Luthango et al (2016) avers reduces vulnerabilities and improves safety. Therefore, in line with the submission of Brown-Luthango et al (2016), and Muggah (2016), concrete social and economic interventions by governments (federal, state and local) that target eradication or reduction of poverty, unemployment and slums have to be provided to support the renewal/upgrade of the core and new residential areas of the city.

Also, as espoused by the CPTED approach, police presence in the residential districts must be increased so as to complement private security measures of

residents. While this can improve urban security, it calls for the need to scale up the police, particularly in the area of training for rapid response to security threats in residences and residential districts. However, the difficulties in achieving these suggestions are obvious; particularly the fact that they impose enormous financial implications on government. Thus, the government should seek collaborations with private sector and international donor agencies. Furthermore, as provided in the VPUU model, which, in addition to physical upgrading, emphasizes interventions to support human development, efforts should be made by the governments (federal, state and local) to address the issue of inequality, which manifests in the wide gap between the poor majority and the few rich in the society. The success of any policy or strategy of government, and that of individuals, as a private or collective measure, to combat urban insecurity depends largely on the extent to which the issue of social inequality, particularly poverty, and its correlates, including unemployment, are effectively addressed.

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